Policy Brief: How Anti-American Radicalism, Political Islam, and the Ruling-Class Academy Converged Against Western Order
Summary
A dangerous political pattern continues to emerge, often described as the Red-Green Alliance. This alliance brings together segments of the radical left and organized political Islam wherever their agendas intersect, above all in hostility toward the United States, Israel, national sovereignty, and the moral foundations of Western civilization.1 It is “red” because it draws on Marxist, socialist, anti‑capitalist, and postcolonial revolutionary currents and “green” because it draws on Islamist religious tradition and imagery, including the Quranic picture of believers in paradise clothed in green. 2 On the green side, Islam is treated not as a private creed but as a comprehensive political, legal, and civilizational order that seeks to reshape public life on its own terms. 3
These two movements disagree profoundly about God, family, gender, liberty, and law. But they often converge around a common negative program: Weaken the American-led order and delegitimize the institutions that sustain it.4 For policymakers, this question is the central point. What emerges is the fact that movements that cannot agree on the good can still cooperate effectively against a common enemy. The Red-Green Alliance is held together by shared political proclivities rooted in anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, grievance politics, and the vocabulary of neo-Marxist liberation ideology. It is amplified by academic frameworks that recast Western civilization as oppressive and treat anti-Western movements as presumptively virtuous forms of resistance. In sum, it is the culmination of the critical theory movement—DEI at its most dangerous and deadly.
Background: Why This Alliance Threatens American Renewal
America’s domestic health and foreign posture cannot be separated. A nation that loses confidence in its own inheritance will struggle to defend its borders, its citizens, its allies, and its way of life. The Red-Green Alliance matters because it poses both an external geopolitical challenge and an internal civilizational one.5 It operates abroad through anti-American mobilization and militancy, and it operates at home through universities, activist networks, media narratives, and institutional pressure campaigns that teach Americans to regard their own country as uniquely guilty.
The alliance does not need a centralized operation or formal headquarters to be effective. Its strength lies in shared frames. Social movement theory describes frames as broad, flexible lenses for interpreting reality. Unlike a narrower frame tied to one specific campaign, a master frame stretches across many different movements, giving them a shared way to make sense of events and assign them meaning. M. Zuhdi Jasser writes, “On its surface, far-left atheism and Islamist religious fanaticism appear to be at odds. But beneath the veneers of ‘woke’ rhetoric and political posturing, their compatibility stands out.”6 The political Left supplies the language of oppression, decolonization, settler colonialism, and liberation. Islamist movements supply mass mobilization, religious intensity, and a civilizational enemy in the West and Israel.7 Together, they create a political grammar in which America’s exercise of power is presumed illegitimate and anti-Western resistance is presumed morally authentic. This is why the alliance must be understood as more than a foreign-policy curiosity. It fundamentally drives campus disorder, antisemitic mobilization, the radicalization of civil society, immigration and integration debates, and the ability of elected officials to defend the national interest. When a society’s elite institutions teach that America is an oppressor nation, enemies of American order do not need to be persuaded from the outside. They find allies already positioned inside the gates.
The “red” side of the Red-Green Alliance refers to the Marxist and radical-left tradition: communist parties, socialist movements, anticapitalist coalitions, and the contemporary progressive left insofar as it interprets politics through anticolonial, anti-Western, and anti-American categories.8 Its unifying thread is opposition to capitalism, Western hegemony, and American geopolitical power. In the words of Karl Marx, “Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.”9
“Green,” in this context, refers to political Islam—specifically, organized Islamist movements whose ideological lineage traces in significant part to the Muslim Brotherhood and whose stated aim is to order society according to Sharia law and Islamic political authority.10 That project is totalizing by design, to be advanced by all available means, including deliberate deception.11 The term carries no environmental meaning, though in Europe the alliance has at times been instrumentalized to advance climate dogma.12
Islamist movements operating within this framework have ranged widely in method, from nonviolent electoral organizing and civic influence to jihadist activity. The recent election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City illustrates the electoral power this alliance can project domestically.13 Mamdani, the city’s first Muslim mayor and an avowed democratic socialist, reached office by forging a coalition that mirrors the Red-Green alignment long documented in the United Kingdom: a deliberate convergence of progressive-left political machinery with Muslim civic organizations carrying institutional ties to Islamist political traditions.14
When discussing the “green” side of the alliance, it is important to understand that Islam is a comprehensive social, legal, and political system rather than a merely private religious commitment. It is also vital to note that the end goal of Islam, like communism, is to dominate the world with its ideology. Fred Farrokh writes, “The goal of Islamic world domination flows originally from a hadith saying of Muhammad, ‘It has been narrated on the authority of Abdullah b. ‘Umar that the Messenger of Allah said: “I have been commanded to fight against people till they testify that there is no god but Allah, that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, and they establish prayer, and pay Zakat and if they do it, their blood and property are guaranteed protection on my behalf except when justified by law, and their affairs rest with Allah.”’”15
The Red-Green Alliance is best understood as a tactical coalition, not a seamless ideological fusion. The two sides do not share a positive vision of ordered liberty, constitutional government, religious freedom, or human flourishing. They cooperate because they share enemies: specifically, Christians, Western political systems, capitalism, and the entire notion of God-given rights. That distinction is critical. Coalitions of shared enemies can be unstable in theory and still destructive in practice. Sirvan Karimi affirms that “the historical force of attraction emanates from their shared hostility toward the US-led Western imperialism in particular and Western liberal democracy in general.”16
Analysis: The Marxist Crisis and the Search for a Substitute Revolutionary Class
Classical Marxism predicted that the industrial working class in advanced capitalist societies would become the revolutionary agent of history. By the mid-twentieth century, that prediction had largely failed in the West. Workers in Europe and North America were not overthrowing capitalism. Many had been integrated into democratic capitalism through rising wages, property ownership, civic institutions, and national belonging.17 But the most consequential integration came through the welfare state itself—and here the story grows more complex. The welfare state did not simply neutralize the revolutionary impulse. It redirected it.
The economist Eduard Heimann, writing as early as 1929, described social policy as “an alien element” introduced into the capitalist order, a Trojan horse that could “penetrate the frontier between capitalism and socialism.”18 The welfare state was not the natural fruit of free-market liberalism. It grew from the logic of Marxist political economy—from the conviction that labor is commodified under capitalism, that the market produces structural exploitation, and that the state must intervene to decommodify the worker’s existence. These are not liberal premises. They are socialist ones, absorbed into the administrative machinery of democratic governance.19
That absorption did not go unnoticed by the left. Marc Grenier observes that “Marx’s revolutionary leanings identified him as a fighter willing to sacrifice anything to realize his conception of a just society and social progress, including whatever cost in human lives.”20 The movement behind Marxism was not satisfied with welfare concessions. The strategic integration of socialist policy mechanisms into liberal democracies was, for the more radical inheritors of the tradition, a halfway house—stabilizing enough to prevent immediate revolution, but insufficient as a final destination.
The failure of the expected proletarian revolution, therefore, forced the left to search for a substitute revolutionary subject. Antonio Gramsci had already begun that search from his prison cell in fascist Italy, arguing that cultural hegemony, not economic crisis, was the deeper mechanism sustaining capitalism in the West. The working class, he reasoned, had been won not merely by wages and welfare but by consent—by the normalization of bourgeois values through schools, churches, and media. Revolution, then, would require a “long march through the institutions.” Herbert Marcuse extended this logic further, concluding by the early 1960s that advanced capitalism had become so pleasantly repressive that the Western proletariat could no longer serve as a revolutionary force at all.21
Increasingly, that substitute subject was found in the colonial and postcolonial world. Frantz Fanon recast Marxist categories entirely, elevating the colonized peasantry—Marx’s despised lumpenproletariat—as the true revolutionary class. Unlike the comfortable Western worker, the colonized subject had not been bought off. Anticolonialism became the master frame. The oppressor-oppressed binary was preserved, but the geography had shifted from the factory floor to the colonial frontier.22
The operative prism was no longer class. The bourgeoisie-versus-proletariat architecture, the load-bearing wall of classical Marxism, was quietly demolished and rebuilt. What replaced it was a dyad of oppressor nations and oppressed peoples. The United States, Western Europe, and Israel became synonymous with domination. The global South became the presumed repository of innocence and revolutionary legitimacy.23 This was not a departure from Marxist logic. It was a translation of it.
That translation required intellectual infrastructure. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Marcuse supplied it. The Frankfurt School took the Marxist binary of oppressor and oppressed and severed it from its economic foundation. Ownership of the means of production was no longer the organizing principle. Culture, language, institutions, and consciousness became the new terrain. The structure was preserved; only the personnel changed. Marcuse completed the move in his 1965 essay “Repressive Tolerance,” arguing that genuine liberation required “intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, and opinions” of the dominant order and “extension of tolerance” to the suppressed and subversive.24 Tolerance, which was once the cardinal virtue of liberal pluralism, was transformed into a selective, blunt instrument. The colonial logic had been imported into the architecture of the West itself.
Operationalization came next, and Paulo Freire arguably provided the first lever. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), Freire applied the binary directly to education. Every classroom was a microcosm of colonial domination, the teacher a dominator, the student a colonized subject. Teaching was not the transmission of knowledge. It was the perpetuation of oppression or, alternatively, its rupture.25 Freire’s influence on American teacher-training programs is difficult to overstate. His categories became the default grammar of pedagogical reform, embedding the oppressor-oppressed dyad into the foundational vocabulary of schools of education across the country. The classroom became a political battleground by design.26
Kimberlé Crenshaw then supplied the multiplication mechanism. Drawing directly from critical theory, Crenshaw introduced intersectionality. Intersectionality is the argument that oppression is not singular but layered, with race, gender, class, and sexuality intersecting to produce compounding experiences of subjugation.27 What intersectionality accomplished, structurally, was the replication of the oppressor-oppressed binary across every available identity category. Every axis could now be parsed as either a source of privilege or a site of victimhood. The more categories one occupied on the “oppressed” side, the more authentic one’s voice and the more institutional weight one’s claims carried. Oppression became a currency, and more categories meant more legitimacy.28
Diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) is the administrative institutionalization of the entire “Red” pipeline. The intellectual lineage ran from Marcuse and Freire through critical race theory and intersectionality into corporate human resources departments, university admissions offices, and federal contracting requirements. DEI programs classify individuals into categories defined by immutable characteristics and assign each a fixed status—privileged or victimized, oppressor or oppressed—as axioms requiring no empirical demonstration. Disparate outcomes between groups are attributed by default to systemic discrimination. The corrective is not an individual remedy but proportional group representation. Equality of outcome is a goal structurally incompatible with liberal meritocracy and constitutionally suspect under the equal protection doctrine. The diagnosis is written in before the inquiry begins.
Robin DiAngelo’s book White Fragility, the most widely adopted DEI training text of the past decade, names the endpoint plainly. DiAngelo identifies “individualism, capitalism, democracy, consumerism, and meritocracy” as ideological supports for racism: the foundational premises of the American experiment recast as instruments of domination. The diagnosis flows directly from the Gramscian–Marcusean tradition, which casts the West not merely as unjust but as constituted by injustice. No reform reaches the root. Only transformation via revolution does.
It was Fanon who supplied the philosophical vocabulary for what transformation requires. In The Wretched of the Earth (1963), Fanon described colonialism as a total system, political, psychological, cultural, and physical, and argued that liberation demanded not reform but rupture. “There is one duty to be done, one end to achieve,” Fanon wrote, “to thrust out colonialism by every means in their power.”29 Violence, in his account, was not merely a tactical instrument.30 It was a necessary cleansing act through which the oppressed recovered agency and humanity. Fanon’s argument proved portable. It could be lifted from its original anticolonial context and applied wherever an adversary could be framed as colonial and a movement could present itself as oppressed. Any such movement could claim the full mantle of liberation.
This is the opening through which the Red-Green Alliance passes. Once opposition to the West is a sufficient moral credential, movements need not be democratic, secular, progressive, or egalitarian. They need only oppose America and its allies.31 Internal character becomes irrelevant. The West is the oppressor by structural definition. Whatever opposes it is, by the same logic, the oppressed and therefore legitimate. The logic demands it. The alliance follows.
In Focus: The Islamist Intellectual Tradition
Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 amid the collapse of Islamic political authority, the rise of European influence, and the secularizing pressures of modernity. Al-Banna’s project was anticolonial and anti-Western, but it was also comprehensive. The Muslim Brotherhood did not seek a narrow religious revival detached from politics. It sought the reordering of society.32 Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has grown into the world’s most influential Islamist movement.33
Al-Banna’s slogan “Islam is the solution” was therefore both theological and political. The Muslim Brotherhood spoke in terms of moral renewal, social justice, anticorruption, poverty, and civilizational restoration.34 That vocabulary did not necessarily make it left-wing. But it created a credibility overlap with the moral language of anticapitalist and anticolonial movements. Both condemned perceived Western decadence, exploitation, and imperial domination, even while disagreeing about almost everything else.
Sayyid Qutb took the baton from al-Banna and further radicalized the project. Qutb described modern societies, including many nominally Muslim societies, as trapped in jahiliyyah—ignorance of divine guidance.35 Capitalism and Marxism were both corrupt in his account: Capitalism privatized God and enthroned appetite; Marxism denied God altogether. The solution was not liberal reform but revolutionary Islamic governance, pursued by a disciplined vanguard through struggle.36 The structural resemblance to Marxist-Leninist politics is important. Qutb and Lenin did not share theology, anthropology, or economics. But both envisioned a revolutionary minority, armed with a totalizing doctrine, leading a struggle against a corrupt order in the name of universal liberation. That shared structure made cooperation intelligible even across deep ideological divides.37
The Islamic Revolution as Proof of Concept and Warning to the West
The Iranian Revolution remains the defining case study of the Red-Green Alliance. It reveals both why the coalition works and why it should alarm anyone committed to liberty, constitutionalism, religious freedom, and national self-government. The Shah of Iran was a central American ally in the Persian Gulf.38 Opposition to him, therefore, drew together communists, socialists, liberal nationalists, guerrilla movements, and Islamists under Ayatollah Khomeini. The coalition was real. The Tudeh Party, the Fedaian guerrillas, the People’s Mujahedin, and Khomeini’s clerical network all participated in the overthrow of the Shah.39
The Iranian left persuaded itself that Khomeini’s Islamic language could be harmonized with socialist aims. Khomeini’s rhetoric of the mostazafin—“the oppressed”—appeared to echo Marxist class analysis. Ali Shariati helped build that bridge by synthesizing elements of Marxist class struggle with Shia revolutionary language. Fanon’s anticolonial vocabulary was translated into an Islamic idiom and then used to mobilize a revolutionary coalition.40 Western intellectuals misread the moment badly. Michel Foucault saw in the revolution a new “political spirituality.” Edward Said, Richard Falk, and Noam Chomsky likewise treated the revolt as an emancipatory blow against Western hegemony.41 Their error was not merely predictive. It was moral and analytical. They judged a movement primarily by what it opposed rather than by what it intended to build.
The verdict came quickly. Once Khomeini consolidated power, the Islamist faction liquidated its left-wing and liberal partners. The Tudeh Party was banned. Leaders were arrested, humiliated, and executed.42 The People’s Mujahedin faced mass repression. Liberal nationalists were pushed out. Universities were purged. Women lost rights that the revolution’s Western admirers had assured would be protected.43 Minoo Jalali laments, “They never thought that it would be a possibility for the clergy to take the power and rule,” she said. ”That was our naiveté—a historic naiveté.”44 Iran in 1979 is therefore not an exception to the Red-Green pattern. It is the pattern in concentrated form. The left uses Islamism as a battering ram against the West; Islamism uses the left as a shield and amplifier until it no longer needs it. Yuval David writes, “In Europe, French intelligence recently named the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations as a training ground for Islamist leaders disguised within mainstream advocacy on Islamophobia and religious freedoms.”45 The outcome is the lesson the literature never stops reciting.
Institutional Legitimacy from Neo-Marxist Critical Theorists
The Red-Green Alliance did not spread in the West merely because activists made tactical decisions. It spread because the academy built a moral and intellectual architecture that made the alliance seem righteous.46 Edward Said’s Orientalism was decisive. Drawing on Foucault’s theory of discourse and power—particularly the idea that knowledge systems are inseparable from the power structures that produce them—Said argued that Western knowledge about the “Orient” was not neutral inquiry but a system of domination.47 Foucault’s concept of discourse explains how institutions such as academia, colonial administration, and literature collectively construct “truths” that reinforce political authority.48 In Orientalism, Said illustrates this through examples such as the consistent portrayal of Eastern societies as irrational, static, and inferior, contrasted with a rational and progressive West. He further points to how scholarly works, travel writings, and colonial policy documents mutually reinforced these stereotypes, creating a self-validating framework that justified imperial control and cultural hierarchy.49
Said’s ideology, which found an incubator at Columbia University, laid the groundwork for Islam’s defense.50 The practical effect was to make criticism of Islam, and later Islamism, appear suspect in advance. If Western critique of Islamism could be framed as colonial discourse, then progressive academics and activists had a powerful reason to avoid such critique altogether.51 This approach immunized political Islam from the normal standards progressives applied elsewhere. The same institutions that denounced Christianity, national borders, and traditional family structures often became strikingly deferential toward Islamist movements.52 Two prime examples are the Women’s March and the framing of “Islamophobia” as a means to silence criticism of Islam.
The 2017 Women’s March, organized explicitly around feminist and LGBTQ+ principles, selected Linda Sarsour, a Muslim political activist, as a cochair despite her dismissal of compulsory hijab in Saudi Arabia, her sympathy for arranged marriages, and her argument “for the competence and benevolence of Sharia.”53 The march simultaneously directed supporters to donate to Islamic Relief, an organization the UAE had designated a terrorist entity for funneling funds to Hamas-connected networks. This deference operated at the institutional level as well: Progressive parties broadly adopted the term “Islamophobia,” a word originating within Muslim Brotherhood networks, as a category placing criticism of political Islam on par with racial bigotry.54
The British Labour Party formalized this position into policy, prohibiting any suggestion that Muslims hold a “propensity for” social or political illiberalism—a protection extended to no other belief system, least of all Christianity. The coalition that claimed to speak for women’s liberation drew the line at applying that standard to political Islam, and then built institutional barriers to ensure no one else would either.55 The contradiction was obvious, but the anticolonial frame resolved it: The West was guilty; the anti-Western actor was authentic.
The result was a generation of students trained to interpret the world through oppression categories that almost always placed America, Israel, and the West in the dock. The academy did not create political Islam, but it gave Western elites a vocabulary for excusing it, romanticizing it, and punishing those who criticized it.56
Institutionalization in Europe
In France, the establishment of SOS Racisme in the early 1980s began the process of reconfiguring the left away from working-class politics toward antiracist ideology. Pierre-André Taguieff coined the term islamogauchisme (Islamo-leftism) to describe the growing proximity between left-wing actors and Islamist movements.57 By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Red-Green cooperation had moved from intellectual affinity to operational coalition. Taguieff’s term entered into the wider public consciousness as France wrestled with religious symbols, immigration, national identity, and the political mobilization surrounding the Iraq War.
The United Kingdom provided a particularly visible model. After September 11, the Stop the War Coalition brought together the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyite organization, and the Muslim Association of Britain, which had Muslim Brotherhood–linked leadership. The coalition organized mass protests against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and later helped produce the RESPECT Party, which combined far-left organizational capacity with Muslim community mobilization and campaigns for the criminalization of “Islamophobia.”58
This is how the alliance usually works in the West. The left provides institutional access, media legitimacy, protest infrastructure, and academic language. Islamist-aligned actors provide grievance mobilization, community networks, and moral intensity. Each side is using the other to achieve specific political goals. The losers are usually ordinary citizens, Christians, Jewish communities, social cohesion, and the very foundations of ordered liberty. Inevitably, the alliance frays, and the communists become targets as well once the revolutionary political objectives have been achieved. The historical record is unambiguous: When the Red-Green Alliance achieves its objectives, the left is systematically eliminated.59
The Coalition’s Master Frames
The Red-Green Alliance survives because it operates through master frames rather than shared doctrine.60 Erving Goffman defines a frame as “an interpretive schema through which information is encountered and processed.”61
- The first master frame is anti-imperialism. America and its allies are depicted as the central oppressors in world history. Any actor opposing them is granted moral standing, even if that actor is authoritarian, theocratic, antisemitic, misogynistic, or openly violent.62
- The second master frame is anti-Zionism. For the Western left, Israel is cast as a settler-colonial outpost and client of American power. For Islamist movements, opposition to Israel is theological, civilizational, and geopolitical. The vocabularies differ, but the operational target is the same. Anti-Zionism becomes the common language through which the coalition coordinates.63
- The third master frame is resistance. This term is deliberately elastic. It can describe protest, propaganda, terrorism, campus occupation, lawfare, or armed struggle. Its function is not precision but moral laundering. By naming an action “resistance,” the coalition shifts attention away from the action itself and toward the target’s alleged guilt.64
- The fourth master frame is “Islamophobia.” Real anti-Muslim hatred should be opposed. But the charge of Islamophobia is frequently used to collapse distinctions between Muslims as people, Islam as a religion, and Islamism as a political ideology. This protects Islamist movements from scrutiny and allows their left-wing allies to discipline dissenters inside Western institutions.65
Through these master frames, the Red-Green Alliance makes use of a symbiotic relationship to grow its power and influence. The rising tide of elected officials affiliated with the Red-Green Alliance is proof that the model is successfully expanding inside the United States. Future policy papers from the Center for Renewing America will assess the current state of the Red-Green Alliance in America and outline strategies for stopping it before it can spur violent revolution against our constitutional order.
Conclusion
America’s task is not to panic, but to see clearly. The nation must defend its sovereignty, its citizens, and its institutions against movements that seek to weaken them from within and without. It must reject the lie that love of country is oppression, that borders are bigotry, that criticism of political Islam is hatred, that a nation rooted in Christian virtue is dangerous, and that antisemitism becomes acceptable when translated into the language of liberation.
A renewed America will need more than policy mechanics. It will also need courage, moral clarity, compelling stories, and a governing vision ordered by God, country, and community. The Red-Green Alliance thrives where the West doubts itself. It recedes where a free people remembers who they are and acts accordingly.
Quintin Baldwin is married with four children and based in Alabama. He runs a Substack on systems thinking and leadership, and enjoys running, reading, and wrangling the family’s new puppy.
Endnotes
1. Eli Lake, “The Ties That Bind Islamists and Progressives,” The Free Press, August 6, 2025, https://www.thefp.com/p/the-ties-that-bind-islamists-and.
2. Khattab, Mustafa, trans., The Clear Quran, Quran.com, accessed August 5, 2026, https://quran.com/al-insan/11-31.
3. Philip Carl Salzman, “The Peculiar Progressive-Islamist Alliance,” PJ Media, April 29, 2019, https://pjmedia.com/philip-carl-salzman/2019/04/29/the-peculiar-progressive-islamist-alliance-n120094.
4. M. Zuhdi Jasser, “How to Understand the Red-Green Axis,” Newsweek, June 25, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/how-understand-red-green-axis-opinion-1603891.
5. Eran Shayshon, Adi Levy, and Abed Assli, “The Red Green Alliance Is Coming to America,” The Reut Group, December 2021, 10, https://20a1ea9b-cbf6-4da3-88fd-ab21d8ba06cc.filesusr.com/ugd/7c17af_60dcdb09b8a14f488920795a3d370e42.pdf.
6. Jasser, “How to Understand the Red-Green Axis.”
7. Tomer Dekel, “A Contextless Context: Postcolonial Studies and Terrorism in Israel and Gaza,” Israel Studies 29, no. 2 (2024): 170–87, https://dx.doi.org/10.2979/is.00022.
8. Fred Farrokh, “Red and Green vs. Purple and Blue: Emerging Alliances in Troubling Times,” 2023, https://www.reachingmuslimpeoples.com/_files/ugd/36c06b_4a9c1626f7294e5fa7e253a5887d713d.pdf?index=true.
9. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore (London, UK: William Reeves, 1888), 34.
10. CRA Staff, “Policy Brief: The Threat of Radical Islam and Sharia Law,” Center for Renewing America, December 9, 2025, https://americarenewing.com/issues/policy-brief-the-threat-of-radical-islam-and-sharia-law.
11. Raymond Ibrahim, “Islam’s Doctrines of Deception,” Middle East Forum, October 1, 2008, https://www.meforum.org/islams-doctrines-of-deception.
12. Enhedslisten, “The Red-Green Alliance,” accessed August 5, 2026, https://enhedslisten.eu/kontakt/enhedslisten-the-red-green-alliance/.
13. Steven Merley, “Zohran K. Mamdani & The Emerging US Red-Green Alliance,” Global Influence Operations Report, November 12, 2025, 4, https://www.global-influence-ops.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Mamdani_Report-Final-1.pdf.
14. Merley, “Zohran K. Mamdani,” 1.
15. Farrokh, “Red and Green”; The Book of Faith, Hadith 22, https://sunnah.com/muslim:22.
16. Sirvan Karimi, “Strange Alliance: The Convergence of the Radical Left and Radical Islam,” E-International Relations, July 23, 2025, https://www.e-ir.info/2025/07/23/strange-alliance-the-convergence-of-the-radical-left-and-radical-islam/.
17. K. Wilson, “Why Didn’t the Revolution Happen?: A Critical Assessment of Marx and Class Struggle,” Hampton Institute, August 25, 2023, https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/why-didnt-the-revolution-happen.
18. Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 1990), 5.
19. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 55–57.
20. Marc Grenier, “God the Son of the Unholy Godless Trinity: Karl Marx (1818-1883),” Journal of Biblical Theology 25, no. 34 (2025): 75, https://www.biblicaltheology.com/Research/GrenierM19.pdf.
21. Douglas Kellner, ed. “Radical Politics, Marcuse, and the New Left,” Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse vol. 3, accessed August 5, 2026, https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/newleftand1960s.pdf.
22. Dekel, “A Contextless Context.”
23. Boaventurade De Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide (Routledge Press, 2014).
24. Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Beacon Press, 1969), 95.
25. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Herder and Herder, 1970), 17–19.
26. Joseph Smith, “Paulo Freire, Educational Revolutionary,” Teaching Times, November 7, 2023, https://www.teachingtimes.com/paulo-freire-educational-revolutionary/.
27. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 141, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8/.
28. Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection,” 148–49.
29. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1963), 21.
30. Noah Rothman, “The Islamic Revolution’s ‘Red-Green Alliance’ Comes to America,” National Review, May 1, 2026, https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/05/the-islamic-revolutions-red-green-alliance-comes-to-america/.
31. James Lindsay, “Why Communists Do the Red-Green Alliance,” New Discourses, February 16, 2026, https://newdiscourses.com/2026/02/why-communists-do-the-red-green-alliance/.
32. Markos Zografos, Genocidal Antisemitism: A Core Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2021), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GenocidalAntisemitism-Markos-Zografos.pdf.
33. Pew Forum on Relgion and Public Life, Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i Islami (Pew Research Center, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami.
34. Pew Forum, Muslim Brotherhood.
35. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Maktabah, 2006), 3, 11.
36. Mark A. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy,” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/lath/2-1/lath.2014.01.04.xml.
37. Arash Davari, Indeterminate Governmentality: Neoliberal Politics in Revolutionary Iran, 1968-1979 (University of California-Los Angeles, 2016), 76–78.
38. Noah Berlatsky, The Iranian Revolution (Greenhaven Press, 2012), 43.
39. Faramarz Bahadori, “History of the Tudeh Party of Iran,” Iran Chamber Society, 1998, https://www.iranchamber.com/history/tudeh/tudeh_party01.php.
40. Lydia Apolinar, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,” Cosmonaut, November 29, 2019, https://cosmonautmag.com/2019/11/ali-shariati-ideologue-of-the-iranian-revolution.
41. Richard Falk, “Edward Said’s Legacy and the Palestinian Struggle,” Project on the Middle East and the Arab Spring, February 8, 2014, https://www.academia.edu/17856043/Edward_Said_s_Legacy_and_the_Palestinian_Struggle_by_Richard_Falk.
42. Yuval David, “How Islamists Exploit the Western Far Left to Promote Extremism,” Middle East Forum, August 6, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/how-islamists-exploit-the-western-far-left-to-promote-extremism.
43. CBC Radio, “In 1979, Iranian Women Protested Mandatory Veiling —Setting the Stage for Today,” October 5, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/iran-women-protests-1979-revolution-1.6605982.
44. CBC Radio, “In 1979, Iranian Women Protested.”
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